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THE R ACE TO THE BOT TOM
Submarine Proliferation and International Security
Jan Joel Andersson

T

he growing need to protect global shipping routes and the intensification
of maritime territorial conflicts have led to a naval arms buildup around
the world.1 Perhaps the most-cited example of this new focus on naval power is
the increasing number of countries building or planning new aircraft carriers,
but many analysts are more concerned about the proliferation of modern attack
submarines.2 Often considered the ultimate weapon of naval warfare, submarines
are versatile platforms able to attack surface ships, conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW), deploy mines, and, as they are increasingly equipped with missiles,
attack land targets.3 In addition, submarines are also highly capable intelligencegathering platforms, able to monitor ship movements over vast distances, cut
undersea communications cables, and insert reconnaissance teams covertly on
hostile shores.4 Since submarines can operate without prior sea and air control,
they allow a weaker actor means to attack a stronger one. Submarines also create
uncertainty for an opponent, since the presence of an enemy submarine is difficult to confirm until an attack takes place. Countering a hostile submarine force
is not only difficult but also very time consuming.5 Given such strong offensive
capabilities, submarines are viewed as especially detrimental to crisis stability.6
Nevertheless, despite the rapidly increasing number of countries buying
submarines and counter to conventional wisdom, I argue that the threat to international security from the current submarine proliferation around the world
may have been exaggerated. In reality, it is very difficult and costly to operate
submarines safely and even more difficult to create and sustain a submarine force
capable of conducting effective combat patrols. Furthermore, the strategic value
of a submarine force in comparison with other defense assets in times of limited
budgets is not always self-evident, and some longtime operators of submarines
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have even abandoned them in favor of larger surface vessels.7 In this article I
analyze the threat to international security from the global proliferation of submarines by focusing on the challenges of maintaining boats and training crews.
The article consists of three main sections: the first maps the global proliferation
of submarines; the second analyzes the threat from this proliferation in terms of
having enough submarines in a fleet, maintaining them, and training and retaining enough personnel; and the third concludes.
THE GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF SUBMARINES
Given submarines’ versatility, many navies around the world are currently procuring or actively contemplating the acquisition of new ones.8 Although the total
number of submarines in the world has fallen since the height of the Cold War,
mainly due to the retirement of large numbers of old Soviet and Chinese boats,
the current global submarine inventory stands at over four hundred submarines
operated by some forty countries (see the table).9 Of these some 390 are attack
submarines or nonstrategic guided-missile submarines. It is estimated that more
than 150 new submarines will be built by 2021 and that up to three hundred
could be launched in the next fifteen to twenty years.10 According to industry
sources, the global submarine market was valued at U.S.$14.4 billion in 2013 and
is expected to grow to $21.7 billion by 2023.11 Such longtime submarine builders and operators as China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States are all renewing their current fleets.12 The main
export markets are, however, in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. In
these regions, many existing submarines from the Soviet era, as well as early German export models, are reaching the ends of their operational lives and need to
be replaced. In addition, several navies without previous experience with the type
are ordering submarines.13 National security is a main reason driving the demand
for submarines in some areas, particularly in Asia, but domestic industrial and
technological development goals, as well as national prestige, are also important
factors.14
The submarine world used to be controlled by the great powers and a handful
of technologically advanced countries, such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
and Sweden. Today, in contrast, submarine operators can be found on every inhabited continent, including Africa.15 In the Middle East, the navies of Algeria,
Egypt, Iran, and Israel have submarines, while Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are contemplating acquisitions.16 In Latin America too, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela all have submarines,
and several of them are in the process of adding to their fleets. In South Asia,
India and Pakistan have long operated submarines and deployed them in war,
while Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) are planning to procure submarines
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3
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in the near future.17 In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are adding new
submarines to already impressive fleets to counter China’s and North Korea’s
very large submarine forces. In Southeast Asia, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have attack submarines, and many plan new
acquisitions.18 In addition, the Philippines and Thailand recently announced that
they too are seeking to obtain submarines.19 Given that many of these countries
are parties to territorial disputes and close to some of the world’s busiest shipping
lanes and maritime choke points, it is not surprising that the proliferating number of submarines around the world has many observers concerned.20
There are not only more submarine operators than ever, but many of the
boats they operate are also more sophisticated than ever.21 India recently joined,
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the nuclearpowered-submarine club.22 Brazil may soon join too, as it has plans to build a
nuclear-powered submarine in the coming decade.23 While it does not enable
submarines to match the underwater endurance of nuclear-powered boats, the
increasing availability of air-independent propulsion (AIP) allows conventionally
powered submarines to remain submerged for weeks rather than days.24 Submarine manufacturers in France, Germany, and Sweden all offer this technology
to prospective buyers around the world.25 China may soon be added to this list;
it is rumored that it may sell AIP-equipped submarines to Pakistan, though no
technical specifications have yet been confirmed.26 Another advanced technology
increasingly being offered to global submarine customers by France, Russia, and
the United States is that of submarine-launched antiship cruise missiles. Among
recent buyers of cruise missiles for submarines are China, Egypt, India, Israel,
Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.27 These new technologies, in combination with more sophisticated sensors, combat systems, and torpedoes, make today’s submarines more capable and versatile than ever.
ANALYZING THE SUBMARINE THREAT
Reflecting the proliferation of submarines, the literature on the global naval arms
buildup is dominated by descriptive accounts of the latest submarines acquisitions and procurement plans of navies around the world. These accounts are
important indicators of armament trends but primarily focus on technical specifications of boats and details of their weapons systems.28 Counting submarines is
easy. It is far more difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a submarine force; rising
numbers alone do not necessarily equate to a rising threat. In fact, few serious attempts are made to evaluate actual status or combat capabilities of the many submarine operators around the world.29 Even in the large literature on the Chinese
submarine program, most studies focus on equipment and overall strategy, rather
Continued on page 17
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Country

Region

SSBN

SSGN

SSN

SSG

SSK/SS

Canada

North America

United States

North America

France

Europe

Germany

Europe

4

Greece

Europe

8

Italy

Europe

6

Netherlands

Europe

4

Norway

Europe

6

Poland

Europe

5

Portugal

Europe

2

Spain

Europe

3

Sweden

Europe

5

Turkey

Europe

14

Ukraine

Europe

1

United Kingdom

Europe

4

Russia

Russia

11

Australia

Asia

China

Asia

India

Asia

Indonesia

Asia

2

Japan

Asia

18

North Korea

Asia

20

South Korea

Asia

12

Malaysia

Asia

2

Pakistan

Asia

5

Singapore

Asia

6

Taiwan

Asia

4

Vietnam

Asia

2

Algeria

Middle East / North Africa

4

Egypt

Middle East / North Africa

4

Iran

Middle East / North Africa

3

Israel

Middle East / North Africa

3
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Country

Region

SSBN

SSGN

SSN

SSG

SSK/SS

Libya

Middle East / North Africa

2

Argentina

Latin America / Caribbean

3

Brazil

Latin America / Caribbean

5

Chile

Latin America / Caribbean

4

Colombia

Latin America / Caribbean

4

Ecuador

Latin America / Caribbean

2

Peru

Latin America / Caribbean

6

Venezuela

Latin America / Caribbean

2

South Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

3

Total

37

12

89

1

17

277

Grand Total: 416
Sources: The Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014); U.S. Navy; “Submarine Proliferation Resource Collection,” NTI,
21 October 2013, www.nti.org/.

than analyzing capability in terms of readiness of boats and training of crews.30
These omissions lead to problems in correct assessment of the threat from the
growing submarine forces around the world.
To deploy a submarine force effectively requires not only boats but the technical skills necessary to service and maintain them and enough trained personnel to operate them. Moreover, an effective submarine force requires means to
communicate with boats and ability to control them once they deploy. These
requirements are hard to fulfill and are far more complex than their application
to surface ships.31
Minimum Numbers
An effective submarine force requires some minimum number of submarines.
Because of the heavy maintenance requirements of submarines, it is generally
held that at least four are necessary to keep one or two continuously on station or
available for deployment.32 A smaller fleet will not provide enough opportunities
for crew training, regular patrol deployments, or maintenance to sustain a capability over time. However, many of the world’s submarine forces are very small,
over a quarter smaller than that threshold size. Of the forty-two current operators, thirteen (see table) have fewer than four submarines (not counting coastal
or midget submarines): Argentina (three), Ecuador (two), Indonesia (two), Iran
(three), Israel (three), Libya (two), Malaysia (two), Portugal (two), South Africa (three), Spain (three), Ukraine (one), Venezuela (two), and Vietnam (two).
Moreover, the submarines in several of these small forces are very old, reaching
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the ends of their safe service lives. Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and
Venezuela all operate thirty-to-forty-year-old submarines that are increasingly
“maintenance heavy” and limited in their ability to go to sea. In a small fleet, this
fact even further restricts opportunities for necessary crew training and patrol
deployments. Some of these countries have recently ordered new submarines
but in most cases will only replace existing boats without significantly increasing
numbers. Some other submarine forces have four or more submarines but only
on paper; in reality, many of their submarines are very old and in extended or
even indefinite maintenance, seriously impacting the training and deployment
of the remaining units.
Maintenance and Logistics
Owing to their taxing underwater environment, submarines are particularly
challenging to keep operational. This is especially the case in the tropics, where
higher salinity and temperature of seawater increase corrosion on equipment
that in many cases was designed for much colder and less corrosive northern climates.33 Modern submarines are complex systems of systems, requiring substantial skills in not only regular ship maintenance but also the upkeep of advanced
propulsion and technology employed in acoustics, electronics, and periscope
optics.34 The catastrophic consequences of mechanical or equipment failure underwater require particular attention to quality control and regular maintenance.
By no means all countries are capable of fully servicing and refitting modern
submarines; many operators are forced to hire foreign help or send their boats
abroad for extended periods of time and at great cost. Any deferment of regular
service and refits quickly renders boats unsafe for operations.35
Maintaining and servicing complex systems like submarines require both
technical expertise and suitable shipyards. The challenges of maintaining submarines with inadequate support organizations can be illustrated by the experience
of the South African navy and its German Type 209 submarines, a minor local
overhaul of one of which commenced in 2007. Inadequate infrastructure and
technical understanding of onboard electrical systems reportedly kept the boat
out of commission for more than five years.36 In August 2012, it was reported,
all three of South Africa’s submarines were in dry dock, the only operational
vessel having crashed into the seabed.37 The problems of maintenance also increase when there are many different types of boats in a fleet.38 The complexity
of servicing the Indian submarine fleet—comprising German Type 209, Russian
Kilo, Russian nuclear-powered Akula II, indigenously designed nuclear-powered
boats, and soon also French Scorpène—must be daunting, to say the least. In fact,
a lack of adequate domestic repair facilities and difficulties in obtaining spare
parts have forced India to send many of its submarines to Russia for lengthy refits
over the years.39
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3
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Even long-established, single-class submarine services can have great difficulties in maintaining their boats. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) currently
operates six Swedish-designed Collins-class submarines that were coproduced in
Australia and commissioned between 1996 and 2003. These boats, among the
largest and most advanced conventional submarines in the world, have suffered
from persistent maintenance problems that have resulted in reduced availability
and opportunities for crew training. The RAN’s stated goal is to have always two
submarines deployed or available for immediate deployment, two in training,
and two in maintenance. However, this goal has reportedly never been achieved;
the navy has at times been
Counting submarines is easy. It is far more
left with only one operational
difficult to evaluate the capabilities of a subsubmarine, sometimes none
marine force; rising numbers alone do not
at all.40
necessarily equate to a rising threat.
Many of the problems of
the Collins-class submarines
are not design related but stem from a failure by the RAN to make adequate
maintenance and logistical arrangements when they entered service.41 This early
lack of attention to maintenance and logistics and subsequent failure to adopt
processes for reliability control led to maintenance backlogs that greatly reduced
the number of available submarines for the RAN. Despite improvements, the
Australian submarine force still has problems with availability, and RAN submarines have reportedly had to withdraw from three recent international exercise
deployments, among them RIMPAC 2012, because of technical problems.42 The
failure of the RAN to establish adequate and comprehensive maintenance procedures for its submarines shows that even experienced operators with access to
domestic comprehensive shipbuilding industries may have trouble keeping their
fleets at sea.
Another case in point is Canada, whose current fleet of four Victoria-class
submarines, bought secondhand from the United Kingdom, has since the boats’
commissioning between 2000 and 2004 suffered ongoing mechanical problems
and accidents. The Royal Canadian Navy has never had more than two of these
boats in operational condition, sometimes none.43 Servicing the boats has proved
not only far more complicated than expected but also far more costly.44 According to defense experts, shortsighted management decisions in the procurement
process, such as failing to acquire sufficient spare parts or establish supplier
relationships beforehand, have led to repeated and significant delays in restoring
submarines to operational status.45 The Canadian submarine fleet is at this writing expected to reach a steady state for the first time in late 2014, whereby three
of its four submarines will be available for operations at any one time, on a rolling
schedule. It will have taken more than a decade to reach this point.46 According
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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to the Canadian navy, the four Victorias together managed to spend only around
1,300 days at sea over the ten-year period 2003–13.47
Maintaining submarines is costly. Any submarine force lacking funds for
maintenance and training will struggle to maintain any useful level of readiness.
To get Canada’s submarine force fully operational, the nation’s Treasury Board
approved in 2008 the expenditure of up to Cdn.$1.5 billion over as many as
fifteen years for the in-service support for the Victoria class. After a competitive
bidding, the Victoria In-Service Support Contract was awarded to the Canadian
Submarine Management Group, currently known as Babcock Canada, Inc.48 In
June 2013 the Canadian government extended the submarine maintenance and
support contract with Babcock Canada, valued at Cdn.$531 million, for another
five years.49
Given that submarines are among the most complicated machines in existence, maintaining them is of central importance. Rigorous and regularly
scheduled maintenance periods are essential. Failure to include the costs of
submarine upkeep in defense budgets may therefore be an indication of a low
level of attention to the issue. As a case in point, in 2011 the Malaysian Ministry
of Defence was awarded an additional allocation of RM 493.3 million ($167 million) to maintain its two recently bought Scorpène submarines, raising the total
defense budget to RM 11 billion ($3.77 billion). Apparently the defense ministry
had not allocated any funds to maintain or administer the submarines in the
original budget.50 Moreover, owing to the lack of necessary local technical expertise to service them, the Malaysian navy’s two Scorpènes are now maintained
by the French company Boustead DCNS Naval Corporation. According to press
reports, Boustead provides full logistics support to the Malaysian navy—spare
parts, workshop equipment, yard facilities and equipment, submarine safety
conditioning facilities, support, and maintenance. The company even provides
tugboat services and operates and maintains ship lifts, and submarine umbilical
services (shore electrical power and the like).51
Submarine operators that do not have the required expertise or the funds to
buy it on commercial terms are left to improvise. Iran, for example, has three
Russian Kilo-class submarines but cannot afford, or does not dare, to send them
back to Russia for refurbishment and upgrade. Russia refuses to provide necessary technical information and spare parts, so Iran has undertaken upgrades
at home. Forced to complete refurbishments and repairs to one of its Kilos on
its own, Iran relaunched it in 2012 after seven years in refit. According to Iranian press releases, replacement parts and components (pumps, compressors,
engines, sound-absorbent tiles, control surfaces, etc.) were locally produced
and installed.52 Some were commonly available, but many others were not. It is
unknown how adequate the Iranian replacement parts have proved, but the fact
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3
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that it took Iran seven years to refit one submarine indicates how challenging it
is to keep modern submarines at sea.
Maintenance and repair needs increase with age, as do difficulties in obtaining
spare parts. Many submarines around the world are over thirty years old, some
over forty. Both Colombia and Venezuela, for example, have 1970s-era Type
209s.53 Taiwan’s two World War II–era Guppy-type submarines are even older
and can be used only for training purposes.54 Indonesia’s two Type 209 boats,
bought from Germany in 1981, have been repeatedly refitted, but they are not
to be replaced until 2020, at which time they will be forty years old.55 Given the
work required to keep such old boats running in tropical climates, their sea time
must be limited and their safety an issue. Some submarine operators simply have
run out of money and seem to do little maintenance or none at all. The Argentine navy as a whole is reportedly in disrepair owing to the absence of funds for
maintenance and training. According to media reports, all three of its submarines
have defects and barely left port in 2012.56 Given the poor maintenance performance of many countries, the operational status of many submarine forces must
be seriously questioned.
Training and Deployment
Operation of a submarine is very different from the case with a surface vessel.
A submarine without a properly trained crew cannot do much more than sail in
and out of harbor. Training submarine crews, however, is especially difficult and
time consuming. To become qualified, a submariner needs between one and two
years of intensive training; fully mastering some high-technology systems, such
as advanced sonar, takes even longer.57 It can take at least six years of training
to make a crew a cohesive unit able to operate at sea effectively.58 A submarine
captain requires, to reach the highest skill levels, between ten and fifteen years
of training and deployment. A submarine’s crew, to remain qualified and maintain its skills, needs regular deployments. While surface sailors and officers can
practice many of their skills on any surface vessel, a submarine crew can train
effectively only on a submarine. Although simulators are becoming increasingly
powerful, many submarine-related skills cannot be learned or maintained except
during actual deployments.59 A lack of training boats and shore facilities quickly
atrophies skills. In navies having only one, two, or a handful of submarines, the
availability of boats on which to train directly bounds the possibility of achieving
trained crews and effective deployments.
In the U.S. Navy, with a large submarine fleet and a high operational tempo,
submarine crews gain experience and maintain skills from repeated and extended
deployments. Other highly regarded submarine services are, for example, the
British, Dutch, German, Japanese, and Swedish. Two common traits among these
services are focus on maintenance and close relationships with original design
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

9

22

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 1, Art. 3

firms and building yards, as a result of which their boats can be used effectively
for training and deployment. For these submarine services, a greater challenge is
to recruit and retain enough personnel. The shortage of personnel means that, for
example, British submarines regularly leave for deployments with less than full
crews; that only three of the Dutch navy’s four submarines can be fully manned;
and that the Swedish navy would be able to send its five submarines to sea simultaneously only by drawing on submarine-qualified personnel assigned to central
staff and shore duties.60
In fact, many if not most submarine services around the world suffer from
recruitment problems. South Korea and Taiwan both have difficulty recruiting
and retaining submariners.61 The Australian navy is so short of submariners that
it can find crews for only three or four of its six boats and actively seeks recruits
from overseas.62 The South African navy needs about 150 submarine-qualified
sailors to form full-time crews for its three boats, but over the last several years it
has had enough sailors to operate only one. Moreover, owing to high operating
expenses and a lack of funds, the ships and submarines of the South African navy
spend a very limited amount of time at sea. On 17 July 2012 the South African
submarine SAS Queen Modjadji collided with the ocean floor during an exercise
because of what a member of parliament described as negligence and poor training.63 Since the other two South African submarines were in long-term maintenance, the crash put the country’s entire submarine fleet in dry dock simultaneously, effectively precluding training.64 In Latin America, many submarines
are in a poor state, resulting in little or no training for crews. According to one
report, Argentina’s submarine crews spent only nineteen total hours submerged
in 2011.65
All submarine services experience incidents and accidents, but with inexperienced crews minor incidents are more likely to have fatal consequences. A
case in point is the Indian navy, where personnel shortages have plagued the
submarine service since its inception in the 1960s. Rapid introduction in a short
time of large numbers of submarines from different countries, while simulta
neously setting up shore support facilities, made recruitment difficult.66 Selection procedures had to be made less stringent, and pay was increased several
times. According to naval historians in India, it was only in the 1990s that the
Indian navy began to attract personnel of the desired caliber to submarines.67
Even today, despite increases in pay, the Indian submarine service seems to suffer from training and maintenance problems.68 In August 2013, explosions sank
INS Sindhurakshak (a Russian-built Kilo) in Mumbai Harbor, killing its crew of
eighteen; the cause, according to preliminary findings, was an accident with or
mishandling of ammunition by inexperienced crew members in the weapons
compartment.69 Another possible explanation for the catastrophic explosion is,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3

10

Andersson: The Race to the Bottom

ANDERSSON

23

according to Russian experts, a violation of safety standards and instructions by
the crew during the recharging of the submarine’s batteries.70 The Sindhurakshak
disaster and subsequent publicity in Indian media on the harsh living conditions
on board Russian-built submarines will hardly make future recruitment any
easier for the Indian submarine service.71
All established submarine services conduct their own training. Some cooperate and send students to each other’s schools. The Australian and Canadian navies, for example, both collaborate with Britain and the United States
in submarine training. Joint submarine training is also common within NATO.
The British and Dutch advanced “Perisher” courses
The threat to international security from the
for prospective submarine
current submarine proliferation around the
commanders are increasingly
world may have been exaggerated.
open to other friendly nations’
submarine communities. Students from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States have all participated in
these legendary courses.72
However, navies with little or no previous submarine experience must seek
training elsewhere. All major exporters of submarines provide some degree of
training to their customers. There is little available information on such programs, but they seem to last between six months and four years, depending on
the nations involved. Sometimes such training is organized by the host navies;
in other cases the companies building the submarines are in charge. The level of
training also depends on the quality of crews sent. Two of the biggest purveyors
of submarine training of this kind are France and Russia.
Malaysia is the most recent beneficiary of French submarine training. In January 2005, 156 Malaysian sailors began a program in France that included at-sea
training on a retired French navy Agosta-class submarine. In December 2005,
twenty-three crew members qualified as submariners, and in January 2009, after
four years of training, the first Malaysian submarine crew became operational.
Information on the level of Malaysian submarine training is scant, but it is known
that the Malaysian navy has long-standing problems recruiting qualified sailors
and coping with technologically advanced systems.73 In this case, after the Malaysian submarines were brought home, local sea trials were repeatedly delayed,
owing to technical and maintenance problems. The submarines have reportedly
been unable at times to conduct basic diving exercises, and they have been criticized for not being deployed.74 Malaysia has since turned to DCI, a French company, which is participating in the creation and running of a submarine school at
the Kota Kinabalu base in Malaysia.75
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Russia is providing training to its many submarine customers in both the
Baltic Sea and in the Far East. Russian submarine training heavily emphasizes
classroom teaching and dockside drills.76 Because Russian submarines have
shorter design life spans than Western boats, Russian-trained crews spend less
time at sea, to minimize wear and tear on components and equipment. Also,
foreign officers are apparently given command of their boats after comparatively
little sea time. The first Vietnamese sailors arrived in Russia in January 2013,
with no experience with the type, to begin the theoretical part of their submarine
training.77 Sea training was conducted near Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea, in
April and May 2013 and included “five 10-days [sic] sea voyages,” according to
press reports.78 The first boat was officially accepted by the Vietnamese navy on
15 January 2014, and its crew began to operate it, after some ten total months of
submarine training.79
Vietnam lacks a domestic submarine training school; India has offered to
train Vietnamese sailors at its own. Even with sustained Russian and Indian
support, however, there are major questions regarding the ability of Vietnam to
develop a fully functioning submarine force over the coming years.80 Moreover,
it is far from clear how these submarines will communicate and fit together with
all the other new ships and aircraft Vietnam is currently acquiring from Russia,
the Netherlands, Canada, and France. Given the Vietnamese military’s limited
experience operating each of these platforms even separately, industry analysts
predict that Vietnam will fall somewhere between Singapore (at the high end)
and Indonesia (at the low end) in ability to create eventually an effective submarine capability.81
COMPLICATED AND COSTLY
There is a great concern among many defense analysts that the rapid spread of
submarines around the world will threaten international crisis stability. More
countries than ever are fielding submarines, but it is less than clear that the risk
of conflict and war has increased thereby. In this article I argue that the threat
from the growing number of submarines around the world may have been overstated. At the very least, the available evidence indicates that building up and
maintaining an effective submarine force are far more complicated and costly
than is commonly understood. By examining maintenance facilities and logistics
organizations we learn that many countries are not able to keep their boats safely
at sea. Having few submarines available, they cannot properly train their crews;
the costly mistakes and deadly accidents that result leave even fewer boats and
personnel for actual deployment.
Accordingly, any assessment of the strategic threat posed by submarine proliferation should focus on the effectiveness of submarine forces’ maintenance and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3
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logistics organizations, the quality of their recruitment and training processes
for crew and commanders, the rates of deployment, and the numbers of patrols
conducted. Many of the world’s navies are finding it hard to maintain and service
their submarines properly or even to recruit and retain qualified personnel, and
these services have little opportunity to conduct enough patrols to give their
crews the operational experience necessary to deploy effectively.
However, any evaluation of a submarine threat must also take available antisubmarine warfare capabilities into account.82 Hunting submarines is difficult
and time consuming. Even advanced navies find ASW taxing; as the British
discovered during the Falklands War, locating even an old and poorly operated
submarine can be a challenge.83 Nevertheless, the very presence of advanced
ASW capabilities can be expected to have a deterring effect on a hostile submarine force. For example, during the East Timor crisis in late 1999, Indonesia’s two
submarines shadowed the fleet carrying the Australian-led peacekeeping force
toward Dili. The presence of Indonesian submarines obliged the force to intensify
the protection of its sea lines of communications and step up the ASW operations
of the escort group of frigates, a destroyer, a cruiser, and ASW patrol aircraft.84
However, once the Indonesian submarines had been detected and their locations
clearly communicated to the Indonesian authorities the submarines withdrew
from the area rather than facing the escorting warships.85 (This incident is, of
course, also a reminder that any maritime force protection ought to include
advanced ASW capabilities, which means that ASW needs to be maintained and
further developed as a naval core competency.)86
While, then, even poorly operated and maintained submarines can never be
completely discounted as threats to international security, we should nevertheless be mindful of the very significant challenges facing many submarine forces
around the world. The conclusion is therefore that the general threat to international security from the growing number of submarines appearing in annual
naval reviews around the world should not be exaggerated; instead, each case
must be carefully examined.
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